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High lights 
1. This paper combine theory of the EOp (Roemer,1998) and analytical framework 
of the reward principle and the compensation principle(Fleurbaey and 
Schokkaert ,2009). 
2. This paper analyzes inequality health care problems between urban and rural in 
China 
3. Based on EOp, This paper discusses the urban-rural integrated medical insurance 
system. 
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Urban-Rural Inequality of Opportunity in Health Care in China 
Abstract: This paper investigates the urban-rural inequality of opportunity in health 
care in China based on the theory of the EOp of Roemer (1998). Following the 
compensation principle proposed by Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2011), this paper 
decomposes the fairness gap in the urban-rural health care utilization. The results 
shows that the ratios of the fairness gap to are 1.167 during 1997-2000 and 1.744 
during 2004-2006. It implies that the degree of the essential inequity is 
underestimated. Meanwhile, upgrading the urban-rural reimbursement ratios is 
probably not sufficient to eliminate the inequality of opportunity in health care 
utilization between urban and rural residents. Under background of urban-rural 
dualistic social structure and the widening of urban-rural income gap, the 
pro-disadvantage policies will be more effective to promote the equality of 
opportunity in health care. 
 
Key words: Equality of opportunity; Health care; Fairness gap; urban-rural integrated 
medical insurance system 
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1. Introduction 
Chinese medical insurance systems is urban-rural dualistic. The Medical 
Insurance for Urban Residents (MIUR) which is only for urban residents, and the 
National Cooperative Medical System (NCMS) which is only for rural residents. 
Owing to deficiency of urban-rural dualistic medical insurance systems, there are 
lager health and health care inequalities between urban and rural in China. In order to 
reducing inequalities of health care system, China initiates the Urban-Rural Integrated 
Medical Insurance System (URIMIS) recently. The URIMIS is still in the stage of 
exploration. The URIMIS aims to realize equality by unifying the two separate 
medical insurance systems. 
The equality divides to two classes in health care, outcome equality and equality 
of opportunity (EOp). The outcome equality means the same reimbursement policy or 
the same health care utilization between urban and rural residents. Most health care 
research rely on outcome equality (Lei and Lin, 2009; Wagstaff et al., 2009; Yip and 
Hsiao, 2009). However, due to large gap in individual and circumstance 
characteristics between urban and rural residents, it may lead to inefficiency
①
. EOp 
means the public opportunities should be equally open to all individuals regardless of 
their races, religions or other factors, which represent the identities (Rawls ,1971). 
Roemer(1993,1998, 2002) refine EOp for empirical studies. EOp is of vital 
importance for both academic researches and policy making (World Bank, 2005). 
Refers to equality of opportunity, Daniels (1985, 1996) analyzes health inequality. 
Zheng (2006) introduces the income-health matrix to measure health opportunity and 
inequality in health security circumstances and socioeconomic structure. Using data 
from the UK National Child Development Study, Rosa Dias (2009) finds a significant 
inequality of opportunity in health. Circumstances can affect the self-assessed health 
level in adulthood directly and indirectly (e.g. through effort such as education), such 
as parental socioeconomic status (SES) and childhood health. Rosa Dias (2010) 
further improves measurement of inequality of opportunity by combining Roemer’s 
framework with the Grossman model of human capital and health demand, and 
discusses the partial-circumstance problem. Based on circumstances of childhood 
condition, Jusot et al. (2010) and Trannoy et al. (2010) research on the inequality of 
opportunity in adulthood health. Balia and Jones (2011) investigate the inequality of 
opportunity in mortality risk among individuals who and whose parents smoke or ever 
smoked. Jones et al. (2012) analyze primarily the role of education in the inequality of 
                                                        
① we’ve given several examples in Appendix as a simple explanation. 
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opportunity in health, and note that there are significant and economically sizable 
linkages between the quality of education and health in some dimensions.  
As mentioned before, there are no relevant topics about China. Based on the 
theory of the EOp(Roemer,1993;1998;2002)and the compensation principle for the 
EOp(Fleurbaey and Schokkaert,2009;2011), this paper calculates and decomposes the 
urban-rural health care fairness gaps in China. Using data from the China Health and 
Nutrition Survey (CHNS), the results show that: (1) during the two periods of 
1997-2000 and 2004-2006, the fairness gaps(when we take urban circumstances as 
the “ideal” reference circumstances)are 1.167 and 1.744 respectively, it indicates that 
the results is underestimated from the original statistical data ; (2) the significance of 
reimbursement ratio decreases in the fairness gap in the later period, which probably 
implies that it is less effective to narrow urban-rural gap only by upgrading the 
reimbursement ratios.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents theories and 
methods. Section 3 outlines data sources and variables. Section 4 calculates and 
explains the urban-rural fairness gaps in health care by using the CHNS data. Section 
5 offers conclusion. 
2. Theories and Methods 
2.1. Equality of Opportunity 
In second principle
②
of justice, Rawls (1971) points out that the public 
opportunities should open to all individuals equally, regardless of races, religions or 
other identity. Difference principle (or Rawls maximin principle) means the most 
disadvantage group should be granted the maximal opportunity. Based on Rawls 
(1971), Sen (1980, 1999) emphasizes that people have the capabilities to choose the 
most value lifestyle. Dworkin (1981a, 1981b) introduces the concept of equality of 
resources. It suggesting that some disadvantages should be compensated, even if they 
are caused by external. Arneson (1989) and Cohen (1989) modify Dworkin’s theory, 
and bring two conceptions: equality of opportunity for welfare and equality of access 
to advantage the. Based on these theories, Roemer (1993, 1998, 2002) proposes an 
axiomatic approach for EOp empirical studies 
According to EOp, one’s advantage (y) is determined by two categories, i.e. 
circumstances (c) and effort (e); the former is beyond one’s control, the latter is not. 
Circumstances classify into J types. The function is as follows: 
                                                        
② The first principle is about the priority of freedom, namely, it should be prior considered, on the premise that all 
people have equal freedom, to maximize the freedom that each one can enjoy. 
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).,( iii ecyy =                             (1) 
It will maximize the advantage of those who possess the least advantage
③
 In a 
fair society(Roemer,1998): 
).~,(minmax ecy
c
                          (2) 
where eɶ  is one’s effort. 
Totaling the advantage of all individuals at each level of effort, we obtain:  
 ,)(),(minmax deefecy
e c∫                       (3) 
where f(e) is the density function of the effort. 
Roemer (1998, pp. 5－32) emphasizes repeatedly that part of the effort can be 
affected by circumstances, which will affect the distribution characteristics of the 
advantage indirectly. It means that the advantage is with the (absolute) level of effort 
rather than (relative) degree of effort in one’s own type. However, the individual only 
take responsibility for degree of effort in his type, not responsible for the distribution 
characteristics of the effort. Thus, Roemer defines one’s degree of effort using the 
quantile pi in the conditional distribution of his type. Function (3) can be rewritten as 
(4), which can also be regarded as an explanation of the maximin principle of Roemer: 
.),(minmax pipi
pi
dcy
c∫                       
(4) 
2.2. Empirical Strategy 
2.2.1. Reward Principle & Compensation Principle 
For the EOp analysis, Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2009, 2011) propose two 
principles－the reward principle and the compensation principle under selective 
egalitarianism. 
Reward principle encourages inequalities caused by effort. For this reason, when 
measuring the EOp, influences from effort should be wiped off firstly. The typical 
method is to calculate the “corrected” advantage ỹi of individual i by fixing the value 
of effort ẽ, i.e. ỹi= y(ci, ẽ). In this way, we can obtain the direct unfairness by 
calculating the inequality in ỹ using traditional methods such as Gini index. 
Compensation principle suggests that the inequalities caused by circumstances 
should be compensated. Whatever the circumstances, each individual should attain the 
same advantage in the same effort. Meanwhile, compensation should be given to 
those who attain less advantage. This principle has a close relationship with the 
horizontal equity, which indicates that the same health care need should receive the 
                                                        
③ It is worth noting that Roemer puts forward a somewhat different proposal from that of Rawls, who cares about 
how to maximize the minimum level of advantage, however, across all individuals regardless of their types. 
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same health care regardless of one’s income level, region or race, etc. All of these 
factors belonging to circumstances. Base on compensation principle, It sets an “ideal” 
distribution of ci (c
*
), and then we obtain the fair distribution of yi (yi
*
) via yi
*
=y(c
*
, ei). 
The unfair inequality of opportunity (the fairness gap) is (yi - yi
*
). 
Though the two principles and their corresponding methods have something in 
common, they are in effect only compatible under one situation that c and e are 
completely independent, i.e. they are additively separable (Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 
2009). Therefore we need to choose between the two for empirical work where in 
most cases we cannot ignore the correlation of c and e. 
This paper will base on the compensation principle in view of the following two 
reasons. First, what we care about is how to reimburse rural residents for their 
disadvantage of circumstances. This is much closer to the logic of the compensation 
principle. Second, reward principle is usually used to explain inequalities within a 
certain group, while compensation principle, between groups. We concern in this 
paper whether the same health care needs attain the same health care between urban 
and rural residents. This is more in line with the compensation principle. 
 
2.2.2. When Roemer Meets Oaxaca 
We define c as the indicator of household register (hukou). If c equal to 1 means 
individual is an urban resident, 0 means rural resident. During the analysis, we define 
all other factors to the vector e, which is classified into two components, e
1 
and e
2
. 
The vector e
1
 is on behalf of factors whose correlation with c will bring about 
illegitimate urban-rural differences, e.g. income level and medical insurance types, etc. 
Contrarily, the vector e
2
 is on behalf of factors which will not bring about illegitimate 
differences, e.g. health care needs (Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2011). In this way, the 
advantage can be expressed as a function of c, e
1 
and e
2
: 
,)()()( 21 iiiii eechc εδχγψβϕα ++++=
                 
(5) 
where hc is the health care use, β, γ and δ are parameters, α is the constant, and εi is an 
error item. In accordance with the definition of e1, it is appropriate to regard e1 as a 
function of c and π (the degree of effort), i.e. 
                 
).,( 11 iii ce piη=
                           
(6) 
Thus (5) can be rewritten as 
.)(),()( 21 iiiiii ecchc εδχpiηγψβϕα ++++= 
              
(7) 
A more general form can be written as 
,)()(),()()( 21 iiiiiiii ecccchc εχρδpiηψµγβϕα ++++++= 
       
(8) 
where we add μ and ρ to separately express the coefficient differences of ),(
1
iic piηψ 
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and χ(ei
2
) between urban and rural groups.  
Defining φ(1)=1, φ(0)=0, and taking urban circumstances (U) as the “ideal” 
reference background (c=1), then we obtain the fairness gap between urban and rural 
residents
④
, as the following:
 
).|,(ˆ)]|,()|,([ˆ)|(ˆˆ.. 1112 RURRRURegf iiii piηψµpiηψpiηψγχρβ  +−++=  (9) 
According to function (9), we can obtain a decomposition form (the right hand of 
this equation) similar to what proposed by Oaxaca (1973). The constant term can be 
regarded as a coefficient of the variable I, whose value is 1 invariably. Here we 
consider I as one of the elements of e2. The fairness gap between urban and rural 
residents divides to three parts. 
2ˆ ˆ ( | )ie Rβ ρχ+
 equals to the coefficient effect of e2. It indicates that the first part 
of health care gap, which is from the insufficient health care expenditure of rural 
residents under urban-rural dualistic.  
1 1ˆ[ ( , | ) ( , | )]i iU R R Rγ ψ η pi ψ η pi− 
equals to the e1 environmental characteristic 
effect. It indicates that the second part of health care gap, which is from the difference 
circumstances. It equals to difference between the counterfactual characteristics of e1 
and actual characteristics. 
1ˆ ( , | )iU Rµψ η pi
 equals to the e1 environmental coefficient effect. It indicates 
that the third part of health care gap, which is from the implacable urban-rural 
coefficient differences of e1. It means there will be a gap even rural residents in the 
urban characteristics. 
 The linear form is: 
   
iiiiiii ececchc ερδµγβα ++++++= 21 )()(
               
(10) 
for (8), and 
  iiiii lcdbcae τpi ++++=
11 )(
                       
(11) 
for (6), where in (11) a is the constant, b, d and l are parameters, and τi is an error item. 
The fairness gap is : 
，)|,(ˆ)]|,()|,([ˆ)|(ˆˆ.. 1112 RUERRERUEReEgf iiii piµpipiγρβ +−++=      (12)
 
We use the propensity score to get the
 
individual π(degree of effort) in his own 
group. Meanwhile, allowing the error terms of (10) and (11) correlated, we use the 
                                                        
④ According to Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2009), the fairness gap should be
 
y(ci,ei)- y(c
*,ei). However, in order to 
obtain positive values of the fairness gap and its components, we use the reverse value here. Since y(c*,ei)and 
y(ci,ei) are the same for urban residents due to the construction of equation, this fairness gap in effect is the 
difference between the counterfactual estimate of the rural residents’ health care expenditure in the urban 
circumstances and the actual health care expenditure of the rural residents. 
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Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) simulation (Gates, 2007)
 ⑤
to estimate the 
system. 
 
3. Data 
3.1. Data Sources 
The sample is from the China Health and Nutrition Survey, which is collected by 
the Carolina Population Center of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and 
the National Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety at the Chinese Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention. It includes nine waves. The URIMIS pilot actions initiate 
since 2009, the NCMS was established in 2003.Therefore, this paper uses data waves 
from 1997 to 2006. We set wave 1997 and 2000 as the period 1 group and waves 2004 
and 2006 as the group of period 2.  
3.2. Variables 
As most empirical research, we employ the health care expenditure during the 
past four weeks as health care utilization. By reference of relative studies on 
racial/ethical disparities of health and health care (e.g. IOM, 2003; McGuire et al., 
2006; Cook et al., 2010; Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2011), we define that e1－vector 
of illegitimate factors－includes variables describing medical insurance policy, region 
and socioeconomic status (SES), etc., and that e2－vector of legitimate factors－
includes variables describing health care needs and individual preferences. variables 
in e1 can be classified into three parts: (1) SES variables including family per capita 
income and education, (2) policy variable, i.e. reimbursement ratio, (3) health care 
environmental variables, including region, medicines availability and travel time for 
doctor visits. Variables in e2 are classified into four parts: (1) demographic variables, 
including age, sex and marital status, (2) general health variables, including 
self-reported health status and chronic disease history, (3) health variables reflecting 
situations of illness, i.e. types of illness one had suffered from and the severity of the 
illness, during the past four weeks, (4) preference variables, including treatment 
preferences and lifestyle preferences such as whether smoke or drink. 
The actual reimbursement ratio(the proportion of health care expenditure paid for 
by the medical insurance
⑥
) may be the best indicator to measure the insuring degree 
                                                        
⑤ As Gates (2007) explains, the GHK simulation has excellent features, and it is widely used in the health 
economics domain, e.g. Deb and Trivedi (2006), Balia and Jones(2008) and Rosa-Dias(2010), etc. STATA has 
already developed the corresponding command cmp, which is detailedly introduced by Roodman (2009).  
⑥ In the CHNS questionnaires there are relevant questions which we can use directly for the measurement. 
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and the health care economic burden. if respondents who did participate in medical 
insurances but spent zero on health care, we take their self-reported policy 
reimbursement ratios
⑦
 as replacements. If one’s self-reported policy reimbursement 
ratio is missing, we replace the missing value with the average value of same 
characteristic respondents. Meanwhile, the treatment preferences are usually ignored 
in the health care researches. In this paper we control the treatment preferences to 
some extent via the answer of “what did you do when you felt ill”. In addition, price 
level adjusts to the 2009 year. 
The final sample includes 4168 individuals. The period 1 includes 1076 sample 
number, and the period 2 includes 3092. In period 1, 412 respondents are from urban 
areas. And, there are 1283 urban respondents and 1809 rural respondents in period 2. 
The description of variables is shown in Table 1, where we see obvious urban-rural 
differences in the past-four-week health care expenditure. The directly observed 
differences are 225.096 and 268.149 respectively in period 1 and period 2, with the 
urban residents expending more in both periods. Urban-rural differences of SES 
variables, income and education, as well as policy variable, actual reimbursement 
ratio, are evident, too. Meanwhile, the urban-rural differences expressed by medical 
environmental variables in e
1
 seem small, which are somewhat counter-intuitive. 
Maybe these available variables are not able to reflect the qualities of health care 
properly or completely, although they do show differences. However, they are still 
reserved for the fairness gap analysis out of consideration for comprehensiveness and 
completion.  
4. Results 
How large are the urban-rural inequalities of opportunity in health care 
utilization? The results are shown in Table 2. 
When the urban circumstances are regarded as the “ideal” reference 
circumstances of c, the total fairness gap is 262.670 yuan in period 1, the urban-rural 
difference is 225.096 yuan. The ratio of the fairness gap is 1.167 in period 1. The 
statistics shows that urban residents spend more 100 yuan than rural residents. 
However, rural residents should spend more 16.7 yuan per capita than urban residents 
through the equity view. The fairness gap will reach 116.7 yuan. Similarly, the 
urban-rural difference is 268.149 yuan in period 2. the calculated fairness gap is 
467.521 yuan. The ratio of the fairness gap to the average urban-rural difference is 
                                                        
⑦ In the CHNS questionnaires the corresponding questions are “What percentage of the fees for outpatient care 
does your insurance pay (not including registration fee)”and “What percentage of the fees for inpatient care does 
your insurance pay (not including food expenses)”. 
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1.744. The statistics shows that rural residents spend less 100 yuan per capita than 
urban residents. Based on the EOp, rural residents should spend 74.4 yuan more per 
capita. Compared with the outcome inequality, situation of rural residents is much 
worse. Moreover, the value of the fairness gap in period 2 is bigger than period 1. it 
shows the inequality of opportunity is increasing with time going.  
Table 2 also shows that the three parts of the fairness gap. The effect of first part 
is more significant than other two parts. The ratios of e
2
 coefficient effects are 0.674 in 
period 1, and 1.173 in period 2. It indicates that the urban-rural gaps accounts for 
57.75% of the whole fairness gap in period 1, and 67.25% in period 2. We think that 
health consciousness and service qualities play a key effect. There is ingrained 
difference between urban and rural residents in the consciousness of health and health 
care utilization and health service qualities. Urban residents prefer to more health 
investment. and usually receive better medicine and techniques first.
 
 
The e
1
 environmental coefficient effect are 8.5% in period 1, and 4.8% in period 
2. In addition, the ratios of e
1
 environmental characteristic effect are 0.408 and 0.522 
respectively. It makes up 34.96% of the whole fairness gap in period 1 and 29.93% in 
period 2.  
    The effect of reimbursement ratio is 0.236 in period 1, 0.003 in period 2. The 
effect is much less in period 2 . The reason is the NCMS initiate after period 1. the 
NCMS reduce reimbursement benefit inequality between urban and rural in medical 
accessibility. 
There is index number problem in the Oaxaca decomposition. Based on De 
Murger et al. (2007), we re-conduct the fairness gap decomposition, with rural 
circumstances (R) as the “ideal” reference circumstances. The robustness test supports 
above result. The details shows in Table 3. 
5. Conclusion 
Based on EOp and compensation principle, This paper analyzes inequality health 
care utilization between urban and rural in China. We define three components of the 
fairness gap, the e
2
 coefficient effect, the e
1
 environmental characteristic effect, and 
the e
1
 environmental coefficient effect. The results indicate that statistical data may 
underestimate the degree of the essential inequalities. These inequalities are from 
environmental characteristic. Inequality of opportunity is due to the expansion of 
income inequality, which is from "hukou" restrictions. Due to the establishment of the 
NCMS, the effect of reimbursement ratio makes a dramatic change during the two 
periods. It reduces the inequalities of opportunity between urban and rural. 
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Due to widening of urban-rural income gap, it is insufficient to narrow the 
fairness-gap only by unifying the medical insurance policies for both urban and rural 
residents. Accordance with the maximin principle of Roemer, our suggestion is 
improve the affordability of the rural poor. 
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Table 1 
Description of Variables 
          Period 1                       Period 2           
      Urban          Rural           Urban           Rural     
Variables Mean Sd. Mean Sd. Mean Sd. Mean Sd. 
y 
Health care expenditure during the past 4 weeks 779.758 2201.553 554.663 2189.791 709.827 5039.766 441.677 2351.327 
e
1
 
Family per capita income (yuan/year) 6943.783 7030.383 4569.000 5328.661 10729.150 10548.700 5796.847 8870.297 
Formal education years 7.124 4.730 5.066 4.031 7.836 4.819 5.516 4.181 
Reimbursement ratio (%) 26.036 37.793 6.143 23.223 25.116 34.834 9.360 24.019 
Region (1= the east region, 0= others) 0.383 0.487 0.325 0.469 0.486 0.500 0.411 0.492 
Travel time (min.) by Bike to health facility 17.197 20.373 16.089 18.706 14.499 14.464 13.439 17.789 
Medicines availability(1=yes, 0=no) 0.951 0.215 0.967 0.179 0.988 0.111 0.985 0.121 
e
2
 
  Basic Demographic Information 
Age (years) 53.008 16.252 52.322 15.692 54.145 15.897 55.435 14.686 
Sex (1=male，0=female) 0.422 0.495 0.438 0.497 0.434 0.496 0.423 0.494 
    Marital status (1= married, 0= others) 0.801 0.400 0.797 0.403 0.796 0.403 0.811 0.392 
General Health Information         
Self-reported health status 
(4=excellent, 3=good, 2=fair, 1=poor) 
2.138 0.750 2.056 0.819 2.228 0.797 2.061 0.785 
 Ever diagnosed High blood pressure (1=yes, 0=no) 0.182 0.386 0.148 0.355 0.246 0.431 0.170 0.376 
Diabetes (1=yes, 0=no) 0.158 0.365 0.123 0.329 0.194 0.396 0.132 0.339 
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Myocardial infarction (1=yes, 0=no) 0.015 0.120 0.014 0.116 0.014 0.118 0.009 0.094 
Apoplexy (1=yes, 0=no) 0.039 0.193 0.027 0.163 0.034 0.180 0.025 0.156 
    Illness During the Past 4 Weeks         
Suffered from chronic or acute diseases (1=yes, 0=no) 0.874 0.332 0.883 0.322 0.634 0.482 0.669 0.471 
Got fever, sore throat or cough (1=yes, 0=no) 0.359 0.480 0.357 0.479 0.373 0.484 0.362 0.481 
  Got diarrhea or stomachache (1=yes, 0=no) 0.126 0.332 0.131 0.338 0.156 0.363 0.153 0.360 
  Got headache or dizziness (1=yes, 0=no) 0.306 0.461 0.283 0.451 0.253 0.435 0.265 0.441 
  Got joint pain or muscle pain (1=yes, 0=no) 0.165 0.372 0.181 0.385 0.260 0.439 0.281 0.450 
  Got rash or dermatitis (1=yes, 0=no) 0.032 0.175 0.024 0.153 0.036 0.186 0.024 0.152 
    Got eye/ear disease (1=yes, 0=no) 0.034 0.181 0.026 0.158 0.062 0.240 0.050 0.217 
Got heart disease/chest pain (1=yes, 0=no) 0.102 0.303 0.069 0.254 0.112 0.316 0.082 0.274 
Got other infectious disease (1=yes, 0=no) 0.032 0.175 0.032 0.175 0.047 0.211 0.050 0.217 
Got noncommunicable disease (1=yes, 0=no) 0.158 0.365 0.149 0.356 0.244 0.430 0.187 0.390 
Severity of the illness (3=quite severe, 2=somewhat                
severe, 1=not severe) 
1.740 0.689 1.640 0.674 1.687 0.657 1.702 0.665 
Inpatient visits (1=yes, 0=no) 0.092 0.290 0.074 0.262 0.031 0.174 0.030 0.170 
Preferences         
What to do when felt ill (4=none, 3=saw a doctor, 
2=saw the local health worker, 1=self care) 
2.522 0.908 2.706 0.751 2.074 1.168 2.472 1.048 
Ever smoked (1=yes, 0=no) 0.250 0.434 0.304 0.460 0.313 0.464 0.307 0.462 
Drink alcohol last year (1=yes, 0=no) 0.316 0.465 0.280 0.449 0.341 0.474 0.280 0.449 
Number of sub-sample 412 664 1283 1809 
Note: “Sd.” denotes standard deviation. 
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Table 2 
Decomposition of the Fairness Gaps Using CHNS Data 
      Period 1             Period 2      
Directly observed average differences  225.096 268.149 
 Fairness Gap Ratio Fairness Gap Ratio 
e2 coefficient effect: 
Age 387.248  1.720  -801.470 -2.989 
Male 76.158  0.338  251.163 0.937 
Married -123.302  -0.548  -105.519 -0.394 
Self-reported health: fair 166.831  0.741  -593.614 -2.214 
Self-reported health: good 56.920  0.253  -305.803 -1.140 
Self-reported health: excellent 18.001  0.080  -29.494 -0.110 
High blood pressure 54.396  0.242  0.897 0.003 
Diabetes -79.090  -0.351  51.664 0.193 
Myocardial infarction 6.067  0.027  -4.507 -0.017 
Apoplexy 7.781  0.035  -3.898 -0.015 
Suffered from chronic or acute diseases 667.391  2.965  -165.665 -0.618 
Got fever, sore throat or cough -136.195  -0.605  90.036 0.336 
Got diarrhea or stomachache -28.023  -0.124  -44.276 -0.165 
Got headache or dizziness 78.907  0.351  -48.257 -0.180 
Got joint pain or muscle pain -1.126  -0.005  41.766 0.156 
Got rash or dermatitis 4.013  0.018  40.411 0.151 
Got eye/ear disease -42.756  -0.190  24.671 0.092 
Got heart disease/chest pain  34.711  0.154  63.017 0.235 
Got other infectious disease 39.230  0.174  17.924 0.067 
Got noncommunicable disease -64.060  -0.285  46.340 0.173 
Severity of the illness: somewhat severe 111.614  0.496  -4.149 -0.015 
Severity of the illness: quite severe 82.171  0.365  133.673 0.499 
Inpatient -8.388  -0.037  43.000 0.160 
To see local health worker when felt ill 0.692  0.003  -20.647 -0.077 
To see a doctor when felt ill 163.488  0.726  189.518 0.707 
To do nothing when felt ill 31.194  0.139  55.693 0.208 
Smoke -3.613  -0.016  -54.234 -0.202 
Drink -165.846  -0.737  -103.918 -0.388 
Wave -27.906  -0.124  -99.114 -0.370 
Intercept -1154.844  -5.130  1649.307 6.151 
 151.663  0.674  314.513 1.173 
e1 environmental characteristic effect:  
Family per capita income -15.542  -0.069  147.014 0.548 
Education 70.475  0.313  13.324 0.050 
Reimbursement ratio 53.126  0.236  0.793 0.003 
East China -8.402  -0.037  -20.763 -0.077 
Travel time to health facility -9.245  -0.041  -0.729 -0.003 
Medicines available 1.352  0.006  0.373 0.001 
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 91.763  0.408  140.011 0.522 
e1 environmental coefficient effect:  
Family per capita income -28.221  -0.125  87.714 0.327 
Education 129.135  0.574  16.578 0.062 
Reimbursement ratio 16.633  0.074  10.050 0.037 
East China -34.839  -0.155  -64.626 -0.241 
Travel time to health facility -68.028  -0.302  21.779 0.081 
Medicines available 4.564  0.020  -58.499 -0.218 
 19.244  0.085  12.997 0.048 
Total 262.670  1.167  467.521 1.744 
Number of sub-sample            1076       3092 
Note: “Ratio” in the 3rd and 5th column denotes the ratio of the decomposed fairness gap as well as the total 
fairness gap, i.e. each cell in the 2nd and 4th column, to the directly observed average difference in the 
corresponding period. 
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Table 3 
Robustness Test of Table 2: Rural as the Reference Circumstances 
        Period 1               Period 2       
Directly observed average differences  225.096 268.149 
 Fairness Gap Ratio Fairness Gap Ratio 
e2 coefficient effect:
 
 
Age 392.324 1.743 -782.817 -2.919 
Male 73.391 0.326 257.510 0.960 
Married -123.965 -0.551 -103.547 -0.386 
Self-reported health: fair 192.867 0.857 -556.721 -2.076 
Self-reported health: good 61.505 0.273 -410.789 -1.532 
Self-reported health: excellent 13.187 0.059 -39.637 -0.148 
High blood pressure 67.092 0.298 1.297 0.005 
Diabetes -101.040 -0.449 75.892 0.283 
Myocardial infarction 6.518 0.029 -7.149 -0.027 
Apoplexy 11.146 0.050 -5.252 -0.020 
Suffered from chronic or acute diseases 660.779 2.936 -156.815 -0.585 
Got fever, sore throat or cough -137.071 -0.609 92.643 0.345 
Got diarrhea or stomachache -26.994 -0.120 -45.075 -0.168 
Got headache or dizziness 85.231 0.379 -46.166 -0.172 
Got joint pain or muscle pain -1.028 -0.005 38.642 0.144 
Got rash or dermatitis 5.254 0.023 60.954 0.227 
Got eye/ear disease -56.747 -0.252 30.534 0.114 
Got heart disease/chest pain  51.078 0.227 86.451 0.322 
Got other infectious disease 39.139 0.174 16.848 0.063 
Got noncommunicable disease -67.785 -0.301 60.327 0.225 
Severity of the illness: somewhat severe 122.736 0.545 -4.157 -0.016 
Severity of the illness: quite severe 103.797 0.461 124.753 0.465 
Inpatient -10.483 -0.047 44.911 0.167 
To see local health worker when felt ill 0.367 0.002 -8.647 -0.032 
To see a doctor when felt ill 151.617 0.674 124.701 0.465 
To do nothing when felt ill 26.976 0.120 53.760 0.200 
Smoke -2.969 -0.013 -55.150 -0.206 
Drink -186.812 -0.830 -126.831 -0.473 
Wave -24.483 -0.109 -97.180 -0.362 
Intercept -1154.844 -5.130 1649.307 6.151 
 170.783 0.759 272.597 1.017 
e1 environmental characteristic effect:  
Family per capita income -0.874 -0.004 72.381 0.270 
Education 18.030 0.080 6.352 0.024 
Reimbursement ratio 16.448 0.073 -16.123 -0.060 
East China -2.170 -0.010 -9.087 -0.034 
Travel time to health facility -4.561 -0.020 -2.447 -0.009 
Medicines available 2.793 0.012 0.519 0.002 
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 29.667 0.132 51.594 0.192 
e1 environmental coefficient effect:  
Family per capita income -42.889 -0.191 162.347 0.605 
Education 181.580 0.807 23.550 0.088 
Reimbursement ratio 53.310 0.237 26.966 0.101 
East China -41.072 -0.182 -76.301 -0.285 
Travel time to health facility 2.187 0.010 -58.644 -0.219 
Medicines available -72.712 -0.323 23.497 0.088 
 80.404 0.357 101.414 0.378 
Total 280.854 1.248 425.605 1.587 
Number of sub-sample 1076 3092 
Note: “Ratio” in the 3rd and 5th column denotes the ratio of the decomposed fairness gap as well as the total 
fairness gap, i.e. each cell in the 2nd and 4th column, to the directly observed average difference in the 
corresponding period. 
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Appendix  
Examples of the Misleading Aspects of the Outcome Equality in the 
Health Care Analysis 
 
In the introduction of this paper, we endorse the idea that we should focus on 
the essential equity, i.e. the equality of opportunity (EOp), rather than the outcome 
equality or the reimbursement equality of health care. Here we give three examples 
as a simple explanation. Example A and B explain the misleading use of the outcome 
equality, and Example C, the reimbursement equality. 
 
Example A: Suppose the aging proportion is higher among urban residents, who 
involuntarily have more health need, and thus more health care expenditure, than the rural 
residents. Such urban-rural differences due to demographic characteristics are indeed reasonable 
and desirable, reflecting the effective allocation of health resources. Under such situation, 
policies need no interfere, while purchasing the outcome equality may result in inefficiency. 
Example B: Suppose there are two residents belonging respectively to the urban and rural 
areas. The health care expenditure of the rural resident should have been 1000 yuan because of 
his serious illness. However, as lack of money or effective medical security, his actual 
expenditure is only 500 yuan. Meanwhile, the urban resident, who enjoys a more generous 
medical insurance, spends the same 500 yuan for a health problem, such as flu, which could have 
been cured with the expense of only 100 yuan. There seems no inequality from straightforward 
the aspect of actual expenditure on health care. However, the essential inequality was concealed. 
Example C: Suppose there are two residents belonging respectively to the urban and rural 
areas and enjoying the same reimbursement of 50%. One day, they both are attacked by a same 
disease, such as flu. However, the rural resident decides not to see a doctor because of lack of 
money, but the urban resident does. Then, the premium paid by the rural resident in effect is used 
to reimburse the urban resident, resulting in the phenomenon of the rural help the urban or the 
poor help the rich, although we are reluctant to face it. Thus when we judge basing on the 
reimbursement equality, such as unifying the reimbursement policies for both urban and rural 
residents, there may also be essential inequities. 
